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Abstract
Neuroeconomic conditions for “rational addiction” (Becker and Murphy, 1988) have 
been unknown. This paper derived the conditions for “rational addiction” by utilizing a 
nonlinear time-perception theory of “hyperbolic” discounting, which is mathematically 
equivalent to the q-exponential intertemporal choice model based on Tsallis' statistics. It 
is shown that (i) Arrow-Pratt measure for temporal cognition corresponds to the degree 
of irrationality (i.e., Prelec’s “decreasing impatience” parameter of temporal 
discounting) and (ii) rationality in addicts is controlled by a nondimensionalization 
parameter of the logarithmic time-perception function. Furthermore, the present theory
illustrates the possibility that addictive drugs increase impulsivity via dopaminergic 
neuroadaptation without increasing irrationality. Future directions in the application of 
the model to studies in neuroeconomics are discussed.
Keywords: Neuroeconomics; Econophysics; Addiction; Dopamine; Rationality; Tsallis'
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1. Introduction:
Delay discounting in intertemporal choice refers to the devaluation of a delayed reward 
compared to the value of an immediate reward (Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Takahashi, 
2009). Impulsivity in intertemporal choice (referred to as “impatience” in behavioral 
economics) is defined as strong preference of smaller but more immediate rewards over 
larger but more delayed ones. Economists Becker and Murphy (1988) proposed a theory 
of rational addiction which associates impulsivity in intertemporal choice and addictive 
behavior. For instance, heroin addicts prefer "sooner but (objectively) smaller" rewards 
(i.e., pleasures from drug intake) over "later but (objectively) larger" rewards (e.g., a 
long lifespan, and a healthy and rich elderly life). Consistent with the proposed 
association between impatience and addiction in the economic theory of rational 
addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988), our neuroeconomic study have demonstrated that 
daily nicotine intake by smokers are associated with strong preference for smaller 
sooner rewards over larger later ones (Ohmura et al., 2005). Agent A who prefers "one 
glass of caipirinha available one year later" over "two glasses of caipirinha available 
[one year plus one week] later" is more impulsive (impatient) than agent B who prefers 
"two glasses of caipirinha available [one year plus one week] later" over "one glass of 
caipirinha available one year later". In this example 1, most people may behave like the 
patient agent B. It is to be noted that both impatient agent A and patient agent B may be 
rational, because, in this example 1 alone, there is no inconsistency even in impatient
agent A's behavior. Suppose the next intertemporal choice example 2. There are two 
options: "one glass of caipirinha available today" and "two glasses of caipirinha
available one week later". In example 2, most people who planned to choose the larger 
later option in example 1 simultaneously tend to prefer "one glass of caipirinha
available today" over "two glasses of caipirinha available one week later". The 
combination of these two intertemproal choices in example 1 (choosing the larger later) 
and example 2 (choosing the smaller sooner) is time-inconsistent (irrational). Namely, 
agents who prefer larger later rewards in the distant future, but prefer smaller sooner 
rewards in the near future are dynamically inconsistent (irrational), because their 
preferences reverse as time passes (Laibson, 1997). Economists Becker and Murphy 
(1988)’s theory of rational addiction assumes addicts are “rational” (in time-consistency 
and maximization of the summed temporally-discounted utility over her lifespan) and 
impatient, resulting in the consumption of harmful drugs at the cost of healthy life in the 
old age. However, it is still possible that addicts are not only more impatient but also 
more irrational (i.e., more time-inconsistent) than non-drug-dependent subjects, as 
economists Gruber and Koszegi (2001) questioned. Therefore, it is important to 
examine neuroeconomic psychophysical, and biophysical conditions under which 
addicts are rational (even though they are impatient), in order to develop neuroeconomic 
theory of addiction and extend the frameworks of econophysics into time-inconsistency 
related to psychophysics of temporal cognition.
I derive, in this paper, conditions on parameters in neuroeconomic theory of 
intertemporal choice which incorporates psychophysics of time-perception (Kim and 
Zauberman, 2009; Takahashi, 2005; Takahashi, 2006; Takahashi et al., 2008; 
Zauberman et al., 2009), and is mathematically equivalent to the q-exponential discount 
model based on Tsallis’ statistics (Cajueiro, 2005; Takahashi et al., 2007). Notably, the 
q-exponential function is a well-studied function in a deformed algebra developed in 
Tsallis' non-extensive thermodynamics (Tsallis, 1994).
This paper is organized in the following manner. In Section 2, I briefly 
introduce the discount models in relation to time-inconsistency (irrationality) and 
time-perception, and their relations to the q-exponential discounting. In Section 3, I 
derive the conditions on the parameters in the introduced discount models and give 
neuroeconomic and biophysical and psychophysical interpretations to the conditions on 
the parameters. In Section 4, some conclusions from this study and future study 
directions by utilizing the present theoretical framework in neuroeconomics of addiction 
are discussed.
2. Rationality in intertemporal choice and psychophysics of time-perception
2.1 Discount function based on Tsallis’ statistics
Rational (i.e., time-consistent) temporal discounting which has been assumed 
in neoclassical economic theory including Becker and Murphy’s theory of rational 
addiction (1988), follows the exponential discount function:
                    V(D) = V(0)exp(-keD)                      (1)
where V(D) is the subjective value of a reward received at delay D, V(0) is the value of 
an immediate reward, and D is the length of delay until the delivery of reward. The free 
parameter ke is an index of the degree to which the delayed reward is discounted, i.e., 
larger ke values correspond to steeper delay discounting. In exponential discounting, 
there is no time-inconsistency because a time discount rate defined as –V(D)’/V(D) is 
constant (=ke) over time. However, as introduced above, human (and animal) subjects 
mostly display preference reversals over time, because the following hyperbolic 
discount equation better fits behavioral data compared to the exponential discount 
function:
                   V (D)= V(0)/(1+khD).                       (2)
where large kh values again correspond to steep discounting. It is important to note that,
in hyperbolic discounting, the discounting rate = -V’/V =kh /(1+khD) (a hyperbolic 
discount rate) is a decreasing function of delay, resulting in preference reversal as time 
passes. In order to quantify the two distinct type of behavioral tendencies in 
intertemporal choice (i.e., irrationality and impatience), recent studies in econophysics 
and neuroeconomics have introduced (Cajueiro, 2005) and examined (Takahashi et al., 
2007) the following q-exponential discount function based on Tsallis' statistics.:
Vq(D)= Vq (0)/ expq(kqD)= Vq (0)/[1+(1-q)kqD]
1/(1-q)          (3)
where Vq(D) is the subjective value of a reward obtained at delay D and kq is a 
parameter of impulsivity at delay D=0 (q-exponential discount rate at delay D=0). When 
q=0, equation 3 is the same as a hyperbolic discount function (equation 2), while q→1, 
is the same as an exponential discount function (equation 1). We have previously 
demonstrated that this q-parameter can be used to assess the deviation of human 
intertemporal choice from exponential discounting in behavioral studies (Takahashi et 
al., 2007).
2.2 Role of psychophysics of time-perception in intertemporal choice
It has been proposed, based on neurochemical and psychophysical findings, that 
incorporating psychophysical effects on time-perception such as Weber-Fechner law (i.e. 
logarithmic time-perception) into exponential discounting may be capable of describing 
empirically observed irrationality in intertemporal choice (Takahashi, 2005). Because in 
logarithmic time-perception, subjective time-duration  (psychological time) is 
expressed as:
                  Da ln (1+bD),                                  (4)
exponential discounting with the subjective delay exponential discounting with 
logarithmic time-perceptionis expressed as:
                  V(D) =V(0)exp(-k
 V(0)exp(-ka ln(1+bD))
= V(0)/(1+bD)g                                 (5)
where V(0) is the value of the immediate reward, D is an objective/physical delay length 
and b and g=ka are free parameters. In equation 4, parameter b is a 
nondimensionalization coefficient of physical time with a dimension of [T-1], while 
parameter a is physically dimensionless (note that psychological time is dimensionless 
in the physical system). Also, parameter k in equation 5 is a physically-dimensionless 
“intrinsic impulsivity (impatience)” parameter in that agents with large k is impulsive 
(impatient) in intertemporal choice with respect to her psychological time . Note also 
that, as one can see from equation 3 and 5, by utilizing relationships q=(g-1)/g and 
kq=bg, we obtain parameters in the q-exponential discount model from those in the 
logarithmic-time exponential discount function (equation 5). Furthermore, recent 
studies in behavioral economics confirmed the logarithmic time-perception theory of 
irrational discounting (Takahashi et al., 2008; Kim and Zauberman, 2009; Zauberman et 
al., 2009).
2.3 Parameters of impatience and irrationality in intertemporal choice
Impulsivity in intertemporal choice (referred to as “impatience” in behavioral 
economics) at delay D is parameterized as the discount rate: DR(D)= - V’(D)/V(D). The 
time-dependency of the discount rate is DR’(D). In order to define the degree of 
“preference reversal” over time in intertemporal choice, behavioral economist Prelec 
(2004) axiomatically analyzed intertemporal choice and proposed the following 
“decreasing impatience” parameter:
DI(D)=
)]'([ln
')]'([ln
D
D

 ,                                           (6)
where )(D is a time-dependent part of discount function: V(D)/V(0). By utilizing the 
definition of the discount rate DR(D)= - V’(D)/V(D)= - [ )(D ]’/[ )(D ], we can see 
that
DI(D)=
)(
)('
DDR
DDR .                                            (7)
Therefore, Prelec’s DI can be interpreted as a time-decay rate of the discount rate, which 
is zero for exponential discounting and positive for irrational intertemporal choice 
associated with preference reversal over time. This study is the first to give this simple 
interpretation for Prelec’s DI (i.e., a time-decay rate of the discount rate). Because the 
degree of irrationality in intertemporal choice (the degree of “preference reversal” over 
time) can be parametrized with this DI parameter, we can utilize the DI parameter to 
derive conditions of rational addiction on parameters in the exponential discounting 
model with logarithmic time-perception (equation 5). It is to be noted that economists 
Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) invented the nonlinearity (concavity) parameter of the 
utility function, in order to parametrize the degree of risk-aversion based on von 
Neumann-Morgenstern’s expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). 
Prelec’s DI (2004) corresponds to Arrow-Pratt measure of concavity of the logged 
discount functions.
3. Conditions for rational addiction
3.1 Rationality in intertemporal choice and nonlinear time-perception
Let us now return to the theory of rational addiction (Becker and Murphy, 1988). The 
rational addiction theory states that addicts (e.g. habitual smokers and alcoholics) are 
more impatient than non-drug-dependent subjects, but not more irrational than 
non-drug-dependent subjects in utility maximization over time. To examine how this is 
possible, by adopting the experimentally-confirmed theory of irrational 
time-discounting (i.e., nonlinear time-perception theory of temporal discounting, 
equation 5) is the objective of this section. By applying the definition of Prelec’s 
parameter of irrationality in intertemporal choice (equation 6) to the following 
exponential discount model with general nonlinear time-perception:
V(D) =V(0)exp(-kD

we obtain the following expression of Prelec’s DI in terms of D
DI(D)=
)('
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D
D

 ,                                              (9)
which indicates that irrationality in intertemporal choice is equal to Arrow-Pratt 
measure of nonlinearity (concavity) of the general psychophysical function of 
time-perception. This is the first study to demonstrate that nonlinearity in 
time-perception, which is parametrized with Arrow-Pratt measure of psychological time, 
equals Prelec’s DI. 
Next, we insert the logarithmic time-perception (equation 4) to equation 9 to 
obtain
DI(D) (for log-time theory of discounting)=
bD
b
1
,                 (10)
which demonstrates that irrationality in intertemporal choice is only related to the 
nondimensionalization parameter b, but unrelated to intrinsic impatience k and the 
dimensionless coefficient of psychological time (parameter a) in equation 4. 
Furthermore, a partial derivative of DI in terms of b is
2)1(
1
bD
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
> 0,                                          (11)                               
indicating that irrationality is enhanced as the nondimensionalization coefficient of 
psychological time in equation 4 increases. Let us then examine how the discount rate 
depends on parameters in exponential discounting with psychological time.
DR(D)=-V’/V
     =k )(' D
      =
bD
kab
1
     =ka[DI(D)],                                                      (12)
indicating that the discount rate of equation 5 increase as any of intrinsic impatience k, 
psychophysical time-perception parameters a and b increases (note that DI(D) is an 
increasing function of b, as indicated in equation 11). Therefore, it can be concluded 
that if addictive drugs do not increase the nonlinearity of psychophysical function of 
time-perception, but potentiate intrinsic impatience and prolong psychological time 
(possibly via dopaminergic neuroadaptations in the brain regions such as the striatum), 
drug addicts may still be as rational as non-drug-dependent subjects, even if they are 
impatient, which is consistent with Becker and Murphy’s theory of rational addiction 
(Becker and Murphy, 1988).
3.2 Rationality in q-exponential discounting based on Tsallis’ statistics
In order to utilize the present framework in Tsallis’ statistics-based 
econophysics, I here denote the parameters of impatience and irrationality (Prelec’s DI) 
in the q-exponential discount model based on Tsallis’ statistics (equation 3):
DRq(D)=
Dqk
k
q
q
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.                                          (13)
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Here we can see that when q→1, DR1 is independent of D and DI1=0, corresponding to 
rational discounting (exponential discounting). Also, by utilizing relationships q=(g-1)/g, 
kq=bg, and g=ka, we obtain equation 10 again. Because the q-exponential function has 
been developed in Tsallis’ statistics-based econophysics (Anteneodo et al., 2002), future 
statistical physical and econophysical studies on temporal discounting can readily 
utilize these equations 13 and 14 and then translate obtained findings into the 
logarithmic time-perception theory of irrational time-discounting, which has both 
psychophysical interpretations and neuroeconomic importance.
4. Conclusions and implications for neuroeconomics and econophysics
Recent human neuropsychopharmacological studies revealed that neuropsychiatric 
patients such as ADHD (attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder)’s temporal discounting 
and time-perception may be modulated by dopamine systems in the brain (Rubia et al., 
2009). Also, time-perception is related to dopaminergic drug-related habit formation 
(Williamson et al., 2008) and impaired time-perception is related to D2 (a subtype of 
dopamine receptors) functioning in the striatum (Ward et al., 2009). These findings 
indicate the important roles of dopamine in time-discounting and time-perception. 
Furthermore, we have previously shown that depressed patients (known to have 
impairment in serotonin activity in the brain) are more time-inconsistent than healthy 
subjects (Takahashi et al., 2008). Therefore, it can be expected that serotonin activity 
modulates the nondimensionalization parameter b of the psychophysical 
time-perception function (equation 4), resulting in exaggerated irrationality in temporal 
discounting. These points should be studied in future neuroeconomic studies.
Finally, it is known that magnitude and sign (i.e. gain/loss) of outcomes affects 
discount rates (Estle et al., 2006). It is possible these effects occur via the 
psychophysical effects on time-perception. For instance, while waiting for a larger 
reward, subjects do not strongly feel the passage of physical time, resulting in the 
“magnitude effect” on temporal discounting (i.e., larger rewards are less steeply 
time-discounted than smaller rewards). If this is the case, future studies should examine 
whether the effects of magnitude on temporal cognition affect nonlinearity of 
time-perception (indicated by parameter b in equation 4).
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